Aristotle's On Interpretation Ch. 8. segment 18a13-18a17: Building on our understanding of what a simple assertion comprises: A study of what Aristotle means with "one thing"

(18a13-18a17) of Ch. 8: Building on our understanding of what a simple assertion comprises: A study of what Aristotle means with "one thing"

Aristotle begins ch. 8 with a definition of the simple assertion. This, together with the compound assertion, he first introduced in ch. 5. There, he described the one as either a single affirmation or negation (e.g. the Sun sets), while the other he recognised as a combination of two or more simple assertions bound together with conjunctions such as “and” (e.g. the Sun sets and the Moon rises). 

In the present text, Aristotle builds on our understanding of what constitutes a simple assertion. Namely, he instructs us that a simple assertion signifies one thing of one thing (ἓν καθ' ἑνὸς). To provide an example, in the assertion “the Sun sets”, the one thing we signify is “sets” and the one thing of which we signify it is “the Sun”. We recognise both to be simple instances of speech (λεγόμενα). More precisely, we identify “the Sun” as a noun (ὄνομα) and “sets” as a verb (ῥῆμα). As we have learned in ch. 2 and ch. 3, nouns and verbs are self-contained instances of speech. They are so to the extent that each carries a standalone meaning.

To gain a better grounding in what constitutes a noun or verb, we refer back to our discussion of Ch. 1. There, we proposed that a noun or verb comprises (i) a sequence of speakable sounds and (ii) a meaning (νόημα) in the form of a communicable concept. When the sequence of sounds is spoken, it evokes its meaning, i.e. it brings the concept which corresponds to it in our minds. In turn, this concept reflects the way a thing (πρᾶγμα) presents itself to us in the world. That is, a concept corresponds to a thing in the world in so far as we happen (a) to apprehend it with our senses and (b) jointly understand it and communicate with one another about it.

So far, Aristotle has offered us two main ways in which we can differentiate and talk about things as they present themselves to us in the world. (i) In the first place as belonging to one of the 10 categories, (ii) in the second place on whether we conceive them as particulars or universals.

(i) The first and most elaborate way he develops in his work the Categories. There, Aristotle fundamentally proposes (a) that part of how we conceptualise the world is by dividing it into things, (b) that those things present themselves to us as being in some order, (c) that one way we can infer this order is by looking at the way we talk about them, (d) that one of the ways we express this order is by treating each of the sum of things as belonging to 1 of 10 categories. In other words, the categories are groupings which help us categorise all things insofar as we are able to comprehend them and talk about them. As such, in Cat. Ch. 4 1b25-2a4, Aristotle states that anything a noun or verb signifies falls under one of those categories. We set them forth in summary form as follows: (i) substances and parts of substances, (ii) quantities, (iii) relatives, (iv) qualities, (v) locations, (vi) moments in time, (vii) being-in-a-position, (viii) having, (ix) doing or acting, (x) being affected or being acted upon.

(ii) A second, less complex way the philosopher introduces in On Int. Ch. 7 17a37-11b1. There, he divides all things into those we conceptualise as (i) particular and those we do as (ii) universal. The former we regard as single, one of a kind things, the latter we think of as instantiated across many things. As such, as Aristotle instructs us, the universals are those things we can predicate of many things and the particulars those we cannot.

We thus arrive at the conclusion that what Aristotle refers to with one thing (ἓν) is the concept of something insofar as it presents itself as one thing, and to the extent that we can signify it with a sequence of spoken sounds. Such a thing we may regard as a particular or a universal and sort it in one of the 10 categories as Aristotle presented them.

When we thus suggest that a simple assertion signifies one thing of one thing, what we mean is that when we make a simple assertion we place a concept of what appears to us to be one thing next to another concept of what appears to us to be one thing and state their status of affiliation.

With a single affirmation we represent two things as being together and with a single negation as being apart. Check Ch. 7 17b27-17b37 for a further development of this.

Now that we have arrived to a more sophisticated understanding of what a simple assertion is and what it comprises, we may venture to identify what it is not and what it does not comprise.

Key points: (i) A simple assertion is a single affirmation or negation. (ii) An affirmation or negation signifies one thing of one thing (iii) each one thing is a concept of something insofar as it presents itself as one thing and to the extent we can signify it with a sequence of spoken sounds. Such a thing we may regard as a particular or a universal and sort it in one of the 10 categories as Aristotle presented them. (iv) When we make a simple assertion we place a concept of what appears to us to be one thing next to another concept of what appears to us to be one thing and state their status of affiliation.

“Landscape in Greece” by Frederic Edwin Church ca. 1873