Aristotle's On Interpretation Ch. 1: On what underlies Language and how we produce Truth with it

(16a1-16a18) On what underlies Language and how we produce Truth with it

(16a1-16a18) Ch. 1 On Interpretation

We now move to the second text in the Organon. In ancient Greek, this work of Aristotle carries the title “Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας”. This we usually find rendered word-for-word as “De Interpretatione” in Latin or as “On Interpretation” in English. Now, a first glance at the title invites us to pose the questions (i) “interpretation in what sense?” and (ii) “interpretation of what?”

(i) interpretation in what sense?

Think of the arrival of swallows in spring. When we map this phenomenon onto our knowledge of weather behaviour, we may come to view the arrival of swallows as a sign that winter is over and warmer days are coming. In this way, ancient weather diviners spent a great amount of time studying the behaviours of animals and associating them with the movements of the weather in order to become better able to predict weather changes. This gave rise to a complex system of signs in which a particular behaviour of a given animal signified a concrete weather prediction (e.g. when the swallows fly high, the weather will be dry). As such, weather diviners pursued to make the weather more intelligible by way of mapping its movements onto animal behaviour.

The term interpretation befits the activity the weather diviners undertook, and it is in this sense, I suspect, that we are to understand this term in the context of the present work. As the activity of laying bare a thing extensively intricate and little intuitive by way of mapping it onto a thing fairly intuitive and appreciably less intricate.

(ii) interpretation of what?

In paragraph 16a4-16a9, we may recognise two forms of interpretation which take place in the human experience:

(a) In the first place, as we interact with the things in the world (πράγματα) through our senses, we innately capture and nurture impressions of them which we carry in our soul (τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθήματα). These are conceptual representations (ὁμοιώματα), i.e. concepts of the things in the world which we fashion within us to constitute the world more intelligible and intuitive to us. An example of this activity is the passage from interacting with particular oak trees to cultivating the concept of the oak tree in our soul. The activity which fashions concepts in the soul out of things in the world may, of course, be described as a form of interpretation.

(b) In the second place, as we feel compelled to communicate with one another about the world, we find that we do not have the natural capacity to readily transfer concepts from our own soul to those of others in our community. Instead, we try to convey what we mean by way of babbling sounds and scribbling lines. With time and practice, we all put together a treasure of spoken and written symbols (σύμβολα) imbued with communicable concepts. These are not confined in one soul only, but shared by the entire community as what we call a language. The activity by which we try to convey what dwells in our soul using such symbols counts as a form of interpretation.

Having speculated what the word interpretation in the title means, as well as discussed two forms of what we may call interpretation in the present context, it remains for us to read and find out what Aristotle will pursue to discuss and to which extend.

(1st par. - 16a1-16a3) Outline of the key terms presently in focus

The philosopher first provides us with an outline of the terms he plans to discuss in the coming chapters. We briefly present possible translations for each term as well as offer their etymology when relevant:

(i) ὄνομα - Lat. nomen: Taken in its general sense, ὄνομα translates very well into English as name. Once we consider the present grammatical context, we may find the term noun to fit best. That being said, ὄνομα here is not noun in the strict sense of substantive (e.g. horse) but also encompasses adjectives (e.g. white) and most pronouns (e.g. they).

(ii) ῥῆμα - Lat. verbum: It is a derivative of the verb εἴρω (to say). In broad terms, we may define ῥῆμα as a thing said. With this term Aristotle points to what we in modern grammatical terms understand as verbs or verb phrases.

(iii) ὰπόφασις and (iv) κατάφασις - Lat. negatio et affirmatio: Aristotle first introduced the terms in Cat. Ch. 10 13a37-13b11. We know these as negation and affirmation respectively. A brief review of the terms in ancient Greek reveals both of them to be compounds of the word φάσις which in this context simply means proposition or statement. The prefixes κατά- for affirmation and ὰπό- for negation signify a turning towards and a turning away respectively. 

(v) ἀπόφανσις - Lat. enuntiatio: It is a derivative of the verb αποφαίνομαι (to assert, to propose, to give a verdict). As such, we may preliminarily understand Aristotle to mean ἀπόφανσις as an assertion or a proposition.

(vi) λόγος - Lat. oratio: It is a derivative of the verb λέγω which means “to put in order” or “to say”. Looking at the various senses of λόγος implicates an extensive philosophical discussion. For our present purpose it suffices to mention that Aristotle treats λόγος as an arrangement of many words. Ackrill, Cooke and Edghill mainly render the term as sentence. Sometimes, however, they also render it as phrase.

Key point: (i) We will discuss six concepts: (i) nouns, (ii) verbs, (iii) negations, (iv) affirmations, (v) propositions and (vi) sentences.

(2nd par. - 16a4-16a9) On language, the soul and the things in the world

• A first understanding of things, impressions and symbols

To better convey how I read this passage, I first pursue to explain what I interpret the following three terms to mean: (i) πράγματα, (ii) ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθήματα, (iii) σύμβολα.

(i) Πράγματα, rendered as “things in the world”, I consider to be things insofar as we have the capacity to apprehend them as things in our day-to-day human experience. They are in the world insofar as they come about in it in some form apprehensible to us. A πράγμα may, for instance, be a cat, an action of that cat, the name “cat”, a thought concerning that cat and so on.

(ii) The word πᾰ́θημα we derive from the verb πᾰ́σχειν (to be affected). Broadly speaking, a πᾰ́θημα is what happens to someone by something. In the present text, Aristotle delineates what he means with παθήματα in two ways. First of all, he locates them in the soul (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ), as opposed to in the body (ἐν τῷ σώματι), and second, he describes them as representations corresponding to (ὁμοιώματα) the things in the world. As such, we may here define a πᾰ́θημα as what happens to the soul by a thing (πράγμα) and describe this happening as an impression of the thing in our soul. To illustrate this, we may think of the paws of an animal and the prints they leave on snow or clay. Now, with the above in mind, I understand this term in English as an impression retained in the soul in the form of a concept.

(iii) A σύμβολον (symbol) is a segment of speech or writing which by popular agreement comes to refer to a thing in the world not as it is but in the way a given community conceptualises that thing to be. That is, insofar as that conceptualisation is communicable. 

We may visualise the relation between things, impressions and symbols as follows:

• On language, the soul and the things in the world

In this paragraph, Aristotle lays out a rudimentary theoretical framework of how humans first capture and then communicate about the things in the world. He identifies spoken language as the basis for written language. In turn, he recognises that language conveys not the things in the world (πράγματα) but impressions of them (παθήματα) which, according to the ancients, reside in our soul. These impressions he describes as representations of the things in the world. 

Aristotle postulates that where language, whether spoken or written, may differ across peoples, the things which underlie it remain always the same. He considers further deliberation on this subject as outside the scope of the present work. 

Key points: (i) Spoken language is the basis for written language. (ii) Language conveys not the things in the world but our impressions of them. (iii) These are no more than representations of the things in the world. (iv) Where language differs across peoples the things which underlie it, according to Aristotle, do not.

(3rd par. - 16a10-16a18) the simple and composite, the true and the false

• On the simple and the composite

In Cat. Ch. 2 1a16-1a19, Aristotle introduces the distinction between simple and composite speech instances (τα λεγόμενᾰ). He gives us the sentence “a man runs” as an example of a composite speech instance, and “a man” and “runs” as examples of simple speech instances. In Cat. Ch. 10 13a37-13b36 the philosopher posits that simple speech instances are neither true nor false, while composite speech instances such as affirmations and negations may only either be true or false.

In the present text, Aristotle elaborates further on our understanding of simple and composite speech instances. Namely, he defines a composite speech instance as the coming together of a noun (e.g. a man) and a verb (e.g. runs). Conversely, a simple speech instance he explains as either a noun without a verb or a verb without a noun. As such, as far as Aristotle is concerned, we now understand combination as the joining of some noun with some verb, and seperation as their coming apart. 

• On the true and the false

The possibility of truth and falsity arises only by the combination of a noun with a verb. This the philosopher proposes to demonstrate with the example of the “goat-stag”, a fictional animal that is half stag and half goat. To this effect, Aristotle first determines that even though this creature is imaginary, its noun “goat-stag” still carries a meaning. Even so, he observes that the meaning of the noun “goat stag” does not encompass its truth or falsity. It is only when we join “goat-stag” with either “is” or “is not” that we get a proposition which may either be true or false.

• On speech and thought

Concluding, in the present chapter, we observe that, by way of analogy, Aristotle already locates (i) the distinction between the simple and the composite as well as (ii) the possibility of truth and falsity first in the thoughts or concepts (νοήμᾰτᾰ) which underlie speech and from there, by way of extension, applies these to speech itself. We may hence consider the thought content which underlies speech to be simple or composite, and if composite true or false analogously. 

Key points: (i) Much like there are simple and composite speech instances, there are also simple and composite thoughts or concepts. (ii) Nouns or verbs in isolation are neither true nor false. (iii) A noun joined with a verb forms a proposition which may either be true or false.