Jun 14·edited Jun 14Liked by Aristotle Study Group
That was a very interesting article, and I anticipate reading the other articles as well with joy. Many thanks for that!
There are two points I wish to address in my comment. First, an intriguing analogy, and then a question.
1.) The relation *True R False*, which exists between simple and composite entities, I have previously observed in a relation *Good R Evil*. This means that those who regard an entity, that is a thought, a disposition, or an act as evil, perceive the simple components thereof still as good, just as one who considers this entity as a whole as good. Such, who think of it as evil, often think that only a particular composition of these [good] elements adopts evil. Thus, with increasing perception, one might distinguish evil from good in the same manner as falsehood from truth within the composition of a sentence.
2.) A matter in which Leibniz stands opposed to Aristotle's logic, and I am curious as to your stance on this. Leibniz was not hesitant to critique the traditional definition of the verb, which traces back to Aristotle—“The verb is a word that signifies time”—by demonstrating that nouns can also signify time: for example, participles, which are nouns (or adjectives) derived from verbs. The distinction of tense can also be applied to nouns, adjectives, and even adverbs.
- For the tense of nouns: "for just as we say amatio [loving], the action of one who loves, so there is amavitio [was loving] or amaturitio [will be loving], the action of one who has loved or will love”
(LH IV 7B, 3 Bl. 41 verso).
- For adjectives and adverbs: For example, rem ridiculuram vel ridiculam futuram, “a will-be-ridiculous or a future ridiculous thing,” whence the adverb ridiculure, “will be ridiculously,” in regard to which Leibniz recalls an amusing anecdote"
(LH IV 7B, 3 Bl. 40 verso).
Consequently, Leibniz rejected the Aristotelian distinction between nouns and verbs and sensibly replaced it with the following: "A noun expresses an idea; a verb expresses a proposition (an affirmation or negation)." Into the class of nouns are drawn not only nouns and adjectives but also pronouns, particles, and adverbs.
Thank you for introducing Leibniz and his concepts in the conversation. I find your comment very interesting.
My position to what you have said is that the contradiction to "all verbs signify time" is not "some nouns signify time". It is "not all verbs signify time". Is that something Leibniz demonstrates.
It seems to me that you are right and that not all verbs signify time. However, Leibniz observation that some nouns also signify time still seems to hold true. That means there must be an underlying principle for each of them that isn't fully expressed yet, and, reduced most simply, it appears to be "A noun expresses an idea; a verb expresses a proposition (an affirmation or negation)." However, I see that one would need to add to that idea.
For example, it appears like all verbs can be reduced to the single substantive verb "to be" and adjectives:
"Peter writes, that is: is writing." Leibniz gave as an example. Likewise, adverbs can be reduced to adjectives, since in a way they are to verbs what adjectives are to substantives, and serve to qualify the verb. Instead of saying, "I sleep deeply," one may say "I am a great sleeper," in which the verb is replaced by a substantive and the adverb by an adjective.
Jun 16·edited Jun 16Liked by Aristotle Study Group
Pardon, I misunderstood you in that case.
I, too, think all verbs signify time. The problem I am speaking of is that it seems like nouns are also able to signify time, thus, if true, the real principle or distinction between nouns and verbs is akin to a deeper reality than just that. Linguistics denote in a very telling way how an individual categorises the world, whether conscious: as for the philosophers, or unconscious. Aristotle, it seems, categorized entities and their properties in a way that emphasizes their present state. In his framework, nouns refer to substances (which are relatively stable and unchanging), and verbs describe actions or states related to these substances, introducing a temporal element.
But others, as Leibniz [and I must say through other considerations I lean towards his view on this], saw reality as more "fluid and interconnected," with substances (monads) encapsulating their entire history and future, thus all of a notion. In this sense, nouns should inherently include temporal dimensions, not just verbs. Thus, while verbs arguably still always are connected to time, now it is that a) time is necessary yet b) not wholly what defines verbs. Thus, if in the noun a temporal state is already included, then the verb would merely signify a negation or affirmation of it.
Consider the noun "river." In a temporal-inclusive approach, "river" would not just mean the physical body of water but would also encompass its past states (e.g., frozen, overflowing) and potential future states (e.g., drying up, changing course). Every logical way a river could be is included in the notion of "river", then. Some languages use inflection to convey temporal information directly within nouns. These inflections can indicate past, present, or future states.
I personally would say both views are logically possible, and both need to be pointed out. Which one is taken, then, should follow from further considerations, whether philosophical or theological.
That's very kind. This is the earliest article I can find of yours and yet it starts with "We now move to the second text in the Organon". Can I ask where the first part is?
My notes on the Categories are not published on Substack yet. There is a secret way to getting them now, though I plan to publish them here after I finish with On interpretation.
Minor point of clarification - I just joined this group, and I notice that this first post listed in the archive begins with "We are moving on to the second book..." or something of the sort. Was the Categories already covered and if so, where? These posts begin with the start of On Interpretation. Thanks!
Yes, when I started this Substack we (our entire study group) had already covered the Categories. I still have all my own notes of "the Categories". I plan to publish them after "On Interpretation".
Mind you, even though "the Categories" precedes "On Interpretation" in the schema of the overall Organon, "On Interpretation" is a standalone work. Furthermore, whenever the Categories becomes in some way relevant I always bring that part in and explain it.
That was a very interesting article, and I anticipate reading the other articles as well with joy. Many thanks for that!
There are two points I wish to address in my comment. First, an intriguing analogy, and then a question.
1.) The relation *True R False*, which exists between simple and composite entities, I have previously observed in a relation *Good R Evil*. This means that those who regard an entity, that is a thought, a disposition, or an act as evil, perceive the simple components thereof still as good, just as one who considers this entity as a whole as good. Such, who think of it as evil, often think that only a particular composition of these [good] elements adopts evil. Thus, with increasing perception, one might distinguish evil from good in the same manner as falsehood from truth within the composition of a sentence.
2.) A matter in which Leibniz stands opposed to Aristotle's logic, and I am curious as to your stance on this. Leibniz was not hesitant to critique the traditional definition of the verb, which traces back to Aristotle—“The verb is a word that signifies time”—by demonstrating that nouns can also signify time: for example, participles, which are nouns (or adjectives) derived from verbs. The distinction of tense can also be applied to nouns, adjectives, and even adverbs.
- For the tense of nouns: "for just as we say amatio [loving], the action of one who loves, so there is amavitio [was loving] or amaturitio [will be loving], the action of one who has loved or will love”
(LH IV 7B, 3 Bl. 41 verso).
- For adjectives and adverbs: For example, rem ridiculuram vel ridiculam futuram, “a will-be-ridiculous or a future ridiculous thing,” whence the adverb ridiculure, “will be ridiculously,” in regard to which Leibniz recalls an amusing anecdote"
(LH IV 7B, 3 Bl. 40 verso).
Consequently, Leibniz rejected the Aristotelian distinction between nouns and verbs and sensibly replaced it with the following: "A noun expresses an idea; a verb expresses a proposition (an affirmation or negation)." Into the class of nouns are drawn not only nouns and adjectives but also pronouns, particles, and adverbs.
Thank you, and with great respect.
Justus
Hey there Justus,
Thank you for introducing Leibniz and his concepts in the conversation. I find your comment very interesting.
My position to what you have said is that the contradiction to "all verbs signify time" is not "some nouns signify time". It is "not all verbs signify time". Is that something Leibniz demonstrates.
Thank you for your reply.
It seems to me that you are right and that not all verbs signify time. However, Leibniz observation that some nouns also signify time still seems to hold true. That means there must be an underlying principle for each of them that isn't fully expressed yet, and, reduced most simply, it appears to be "A noun expresses an idea; a verb expresses a proposition (an affirmation or negation)." However, I see that one would need to add to that idea.
For example, it appears like all verbs can be reduced to the single substantive verb "to be" and adjectives:
"Peter writes, that is: is writing." Leibniz gave as an example. Likewise, adverbs can be reduced to adjectives, since in a way they are to verbs what adjectives are to substantives, and serve to qualify the verb. Instead of saying, "I sleep deeply," one may say "I am a great sleeper," in which the verb is replaced by a substantive and the adverb by an adjective.
Hey there, thank you for your reply.
My position is that all verbs signify time. Can you point me to a verb that does not?
Pardon, I misunderstood you in that case.
I, too, think all verbs signify time. The problem I am speaking of is that it seems like nouns are also able to signify time, thus, if true, the real principle or distinction between nouns and verbs is akin to a deeper reality than just that. Linguistics denote in a very telling way how an individual categorises the world, whether conscious: as for the philosophers, or unconscious. Aristotle, it seems, categorized entities and their properties in a way that emphasizes their present state. In his framework, nouns refer to substances (which are relatively stable and unchanging), and verbs describe actions or states related to these substances, introducing a temporal element.
But others, as Leibniz [and I must say through other considerations I lean towards his view on this], saw reality as more "fluid and interconnected," with substances (monads) encapsulating their entire history and future, thus all of a notion. In this sense, nouns should inherently include temporal dimensions, not just verbs. Thus, while verbs arguably still always are connected to time, now it is that a) time is necessary yet b) not wholly what defines verbs. Thus, if in the noun a temporal state is already included, then the verb would merely signify a negation or affirmation of it.
Consider the noun "river." In a temporal-inclusive approach, "river" would not just mean the physical body of water but would also encompass its past states (e.g., frozen, overflowing) and potential future states (e.g., drying up, changing course). Every logical way a river could be is included in the notion of "river", then. Some languages use inflection to convey temporal information directly within nouns. These inflections can indicate past, present, or future states.
I personally would say both views are logically possible, and both need to be pointed out. Which one is taken, then, should follow from further considerations, whether philosophical or theological.
Are you reading a translation? I’d like to read along. Sorry if you’ve noted it somewhere.
Hey there,
Personally, I look at any number of translations as well as the Greek text.
With that said, my experience tells me that most of the time reading Ackrill's and/or Edgehill's is good enough.
I've just found your Substack. I've read Averroes' Summa of the Organon in Arabic. This should be interesting to read it in English with the group.
Definitely interesting for us to have a reader of Averroes. We are gathering tonight at 2030 central European. Link is in our about :)
Honestly. Is there anything harder to navigate than substack? I just want to read this in order from the beginning.
Hey there! Let me know whenever you can't find something. I will happily send you a link.
That's very kind. This is the earliest article I can find of yours and yet it starts with "We now move to the second text in the Organon". Can I ask where the first part is?
My notes on the Categories are not published on Substack yet. There is a secret way to getting them now, though I plan to publish them here after I finish with On interpretation.
I see. Thank you.
Sorry to be pedantic but you spelled ‘interpretation’ wrong in the title.
Thank you!
Minor point of clarification - I just joined this group, and I notice that this first post listed in the archive begins with "We are moving on to the second book..." or something of the sort. Was the Categories already covered and if so, where? These posts begin with the start of On Interpretation. Thanks!
Hey there Brandon, thank you for reaching out.
Yes, when I started this Substack we (our entire study group) had already covered the Categories. I still have all my own notes of "the Categories". I plan to publish them after "On Interpretation".
Mind you, even though "the Categories" precedes "On Interpretation" in the schema of the overall Organon, "On Interpretation" is a standalone work. Furthermore, whenever the Categories becomes in some way relevant I always bring that part in and explain it.
Excellent. Thanks for the context.
I very much enjoyed this break down, ASG...thank you!