Aristotle's On Interpretation Ch. 3 : On the Verb
(16b6-16b25) Ch. 3 On the Verb
A first look at the word ῥῆμα or verb
We next concern ourselves with what Aristotle calls ῥῆμα. Ῥῆμα is a derivative of εἴρω (to say) and in English broadly translates as “a thing said”, i.e. a saying. Depending on the context, we may render ῥῆμα as a saying in the sense of an idiom (e.g. he hit two birds with one stone), or a proverb (e.g. the early bird catches the worm), or a quotation (e.g. “they are birds of a feather” she said). This acknowledged, in the present text, the philosopher does not use the term in any of the above senses. Instead, once we go through Aristotle’s explanation and examples, we find ῥῆμα to be a near equivalent of what in contemporary grammatical terms we call a verb. Here, we note that the English word verb etymologically proceeds from the Latin verbum, a direct equivalent of ῥῆμα which likewise means a thing said or a saying. Afterall, as Aristotle suggests a verb is a sign of things said of another thing.
What we know about verbs so far
Next to the noun, the verb features as one of two simple speech instances Aristotle recognises as significant in their own right. Put differently, out of all possible speech instances, the noun and the verb stand out because they cannot be broken down to more elementary instances of speech which are self-contained and carry a standalone meaning. In fact, the syllables and phonemes which comprise nouns and verbs are neither standalone nor significant on their own. Conversely, all meaningful speech instances which are neither nouns nor verbs arise from combinations of the two. As a matter of fact, because of this, Aristotle calls all other meaningful speech instances composite.
This acknowledged, a verb, much like a noun, never conveys whether it is true or false. Instead, as Aristotle asserts in On Int. Ch. 1 16a10-16a1, it is only when we somehow link a noun together with a verb, that we may thereby form instances of speech which are either true or false.
In light of this, we may thus seek to find out what nouns and verbs have further in common as well as what sets them apart. As such, let us examine what Aristotle has to say about the verb.
What counts as a verb
Where a single word may count as a verb (e.g. the “put” in “I put”), we acknowledge that not all verbs are single words. Instead, depending on the language, we often find that grammatical constructions made up of more than one words constitute a sole verb. An example of this are the phrasal verbs we find in the English language. Such verbs are made up of a base verb accompanied by adverb particle(s) (e.g. put out, put up with). Such particles count as parts of their verbs despite the space between them and that verb. As such, “put out” and “put up with” are verbs in the same way “put” is a verb. We note, that in Greek or Latin particles are frequently adjoined to the base verb as prefixes (e.g. consider the verb “outmatch”).
(1st, 2nd pars. - 16b6-16b10) first observations on the verb
In the present chapter, the philosopher introduces the verb by way of discussing the following three points: (i) verbs convey time, (ii) no segment of the speech or writing which constitutes a verb carries a meaning by itself, (iii) a verb is a sign of things said of another thing, the subject.
(i) verbs convey time
What foremost stands out in a verb, which sets it apart from any noun, is that part of what it conveys ties the rest of its meaning to the present time.
By way of illustration, we identify the word “horse” as a noun and know it to stand for something as a symbol. What the noun conveys, however, does not situate its being across time. The noun does not place what underlies it in the present time. A verb such as “runs” in “a horse runs”, on the other hand, is a verb exactly because it carries meaning which situates the rest of what it conveys in the present time.
(ii) no segment of a verb is meaningful on its own
In a manner analogous to the noun, no segment of the speech or writing which constitutes a verb holds meaning on its own. To this effect, neither “-low” nor “flo-” nor any other segment of the verb “flow”, for instance, carries a meaning of its own.
Furthermore, “over” and “flow” may carry a standalone meaning when separate. Once we join them together, however, whether as “overflow” or as “flow over”, they no longer hold individual meanings, but only contribute in the overall meaning of the verb they comprise.
(iii) a verb is a sign of things said of a subject
In the present text, Aristotle identifies the verb as a sign of things said of a subject. With this we mean that in a sentence what a verb conveys always refers to something else, i.e. the subject of that sentence. To illustrate, in the sentence “a horse runs” the verb “runs” conveys something about the subject “a horse”.
What Aristotle identifies as a noun, on the other hand, either is a subject or is said of a subject. For example, in the sentence “a horse is an animal”, the noun “a horse” occupies the place of subject, whereas the noun “an animal”, while still in the nominative case, forms part of the predicate and, as such, is said of the subject.
Key points: (i) verbs convey time, (ii) no piece of a verb carries standalone meaning, (iii) verbs are signs of things said of other things, specifically a subject.
(3rd par. - 16b11-16b16) on definite and indefinite verbs
Verbs, in the same way as nouns, arise from pairing a spoken sound or written mark with some meaning. Now, when we ascribe a verb such as “runs” a meaning, we simultaneously exclude it from signifying any and all other possible meanings. As such, we describe “runs” as a definite verb because the scope of what it conveys is fairly narrow.
Conversely, “does not run” merely signifies the exclusion of what “runs” conveys. Unlike “runs” it does not mean something definite. Instead, it means the exclusion of something definite from the entire pool of possible equivalents. As such “does not run” signifies anything that is not “runs”. For this reason, Aristotle chooses to call such a symbol an indefinite verb.
Key points: (i) a verb always stands for something definite. (ii) The verb “runs”, for example, stands for what underlies it and nothing beyond it. (iii) “does not run”, however, only symbolises the exclusion of what underlies “runs”. (iv) Aristotle calls such verbs indefinite.
(4th par. - 16b17-16b18) on verb tenses
When a simple speech instance situates its meaning in a time outside the present, i.e. either in the past or the future, Aristotle recognises this not as a verb but as a verb tense.
At this point, we find it worthwhile to gain a brief overview of the tenses familiar to Aristotle in ancient Greek as well as their equivalents in English. These are (i) the present, (ii) the aorist, (iii) the imperfect, (iv) the future, (v) the perfect, (vi) the pluperfect and (vii) the future perfect.
(i) Aristotle considers verbs in the present as verbs to begin with. The present tense in ancient Greek encompasses both the uses of the present simple and the present continuous in English.
(ii) The aorist is a past tense equivalent to the past simple in English. What sets it apart from the other past tenses is that we mainly use it to refer to past one-off actions or events.
(iii) The imperfect, on the other hand, mainly refers to recurring habitual action in the past. The equivalent for this in English is the construction “used to+infinitive” (e.g. I use to go there).
(iv) The ancient Greek future encompasses both the will + infinitive and the going to + infinitive futures in English.
(v) The perfect tense typically refers to the present status of an action or event which first began in the past. In English, we call it the present perfect and form it with the auxiliary verb to have + the past participle of the verb (e.g. I have watered the plant). We note here that where in English grammar the perfect may be considered an aspect, in ancient Greek it was definitely considered a tense. In fact, in ancient Greek grammar there existed no concept of verb aspects.
(vi) The pluperfect and (vii) the future perfect of ancient Greek are equivalent to the past and future perfect in English respectively.
What counts as the tense of a verb
Ancient Greek tenses were by and large expressed through changes in the ending of the verb. To illustrate, some of the tenses of the ancient Greek verb πέμπω (send) are: (i) aorist: ἔπεμψα, (ii) imperfect: πέμπεσκον, (iii) future: πέμψω, (iv) perfect: πέπομφᾰ, (v) pluperfect: ἐπεπόμφειν.
In English, on the other hand, such tenses are frequently expressed through the use of auxiliary verbs plus verb forms such as the gerund or the participle. To illustrate, a few tenses of the verb to send in English include (i) past simple: sent, (ii) past continuous: was sending, (iii) future: will send, (iv) present perfect: have sent, (v) past perfect continuous: had been sending.
With this in mind, we find it useful to assert the following: (a) all tenses of a verb are tenses of that verb equally, (b) no segment of a verb tense has a meaning on its own.
(a) No matter how many words come together to form the tense of a verb, we consider all tenses of a verb to be tenses of that verb equally. As such “sent” is as much a verb tense as “will send” or “had been sending”.
(b) For our present purposes, no segment of a verb tense is meaningful on its own. In the case of “will send”, for example, “will” and “send” only participate in the overall meaning of that tense. They carry no meaning outside “will send” as standalone words.
Key point: (i) When a simple speech instance situates its meaning outside the present time, i.e. either in the past or the future, Aristotle does not consider it to be a verb but the tense of a verb.
(5th par. - 16b19-16b25) on verbs in isolation
In a sentence such as “the goatstag exists”, it is easy to recognise “the goatstag” as the subject of that sentence and a noun. Similarly, “exists” we easily recognise as a verb and the predicate of the same sentence. Furthermore, that sentence clearly communicates that something, i.e. the goatstag, exists.
When we consider the parts of that sentence in isolation, however, i.e. the noun “the goatstag” and the verb “exists”, we find that even though each carries a standalone meaning, that neither of the two signify the existence of something. This is the case even with the verb “exists”.
That being said, Aristotle asserts that when in isolation a verb implies strongly that it ought to be combined with something else. This is because a verb is a sign of things said of something else. As such, a verb by definition implies that there is some other thing to which its meaning refers to in the first place.
Key points: (i) A verb by itself does not signify whether something exists or not. (ii) It always implies, however, that it ought to combine with something else. This is because a verb as sign by definition refers to things said of something else.
