One point - universals are intramental concepts like "man" (viz. in general). Some translations make it "a man" but this is a mistake. So what is translated "all men" does not mean "every individual man" but rather the whole of the universal. Ex: "some animals are men" means not "some of the individual animals are men right now", but more like "a portion of the extratemporal universal "animal" is the species "man"". And ofc this is what he's talking about with "universals taken universally" etc earlier on. The earlier logical works must be interpreted in light of the Posterior Analytics, and the Analytica (esp. the mixed modals!) will not make sense if you read universals as sets of particulars. But this is gold overall, delighted to see people working through these difficult and oft-neglected texts. I'll try to keep following along.
Is the above your refutation of nominalists like William of Ockham of "razor fame"? How else is a nominalist to describe some of our supposed (by nominalists) errors (about universals) other than our confusion about "sets of particulars", since we think of them as "general ideas or concepts", while nominalists do not believe in "general ideas" or "general concepts"?
He is trying to convey what he thinks to have been the way Aristotle thought about universals. Thank you for adding to this very useful conversation :)
You're welcome. He was trying to do that for sure. But, still, something seems a little "off" for I think that both you and I know that 1 man or 1 individual "anything" of an unambiguous Aristotelian Square of Logical opposition is entirely capable of logically contradicting the universal logical opposite. In fact I watched you employing one of those metaphorical squares to refute some fella who preferred Leibniz to Aristotle in your very first post (if memory serves).
And we also know (I presume) that universals are predicable of more than one thing --- which is much less ambiguous than the debates about universals which erupted after Aquinas' death --- which began a death spiral for/of scholasticism. Wouldn't want to see that here. Love the beauty with which you introduce your logical explications i.e. the images at your site. You are very clever, very hard working and very clear. Well done.
Yes, one counter example falsifies a universal, but universals in themselves are not bounded by time nor are they sets. He does say this in the posterior analytics and elsewhere. "1+1 is 2" doesn't refer to particular monads, nor do other universals like "man" when we speak as 'scientists'. Just because universals are said of many, and predicable of particulars, does not mean that the universal itself is a "set" of particulars, Aristotle rejects this in Post An when he talks about how science has nothing to do with particulars. And again if you make it to the mixed modals, and try to follow his logic there, you'll see pretty quickly that it's not possible for these universals to be sets, besides the other passages I've mentioned that openly deny that universals are sets of particulars. It is not logically possible for "man=all these men here" to be predicated universally and of other men, universals must be prior to particulars and hence not particulars or mere groups *of* particulars at all. How could a set of particulars be predicated of a particular? This is not a "fringe" opinion lol. And it has nothing to do with metaphysics, it's simply the logical nature of the universal, and says nothing about what a universal really is or how it's related to particulars, which is a separate question. Whether "the dyad" is a being, a cause, a concept, etc has no bearing on "2" not being "every 2 that ever has been, is, or will be", which would be incoherent. What does this mean for de int? When Aristotle talks about universals taken universally those aren't empty words, and the thought conveyed by "all men" is not, in fact, "all the men". Likewise a universal simpliciter would be "man", not "a man".
IAN: [Initial post.] So what is translated "all men" does not mean "every individual man" but rather the whole of the universal.
IAN: [This post] Aristotle rejects this [Aristotle rejects the idea that universals are sets of particulars; even though Aristotle hadn't heard of Uncle Bertie's "set theory" in the 4th century B.C. KB] in Post An when he talks about how science has nothing to do with particulars. [N.B. Science has nothing to do with particulars.]
ARISTOTLE: With a view to action experience seems in no respect inferior to art, and men of experience succeed even better than those who have theory without experience. (The reason is that experience is knowledge of individuals, art of universals, and actions and productions are all concerned with the INDIVIDUAL; for the physician does not cure man, except in an incidental way, but Callias or Socrates or some other called by some such individual name, who happens to be a man. If, then, a man has the theory without the experience, and recognizes the UNIVERSAL but does not know the INDIVIDUAL included in this, he will often fail to cure; for it is the INDIVIDUAL that is to be cured.) [Metaphysics BkI, Ch.1, 4rth paragraph]
1. COMMENT and 1 QUESTION and 1 Admonition: Medical science has everything to do with particular individuals --- a.k.a. particulars! So what are you attempting above, Ian? I have an idea for you. When you try to attribute an idea to Aristotle, then quote him.
Aristotle actually said that UNIVERSALS are IMPERCEPTIBLE, which refutes the entire cohort of British so-called "Empiricists", including Uncle Bertie Russell and his goofy "sets". Quote
ARISTOTLE: Seeing, therefore, that demonstrations are commensurately universal and universals imperceptible, we clearly cannot obtain scientific knowledge by the act of perception. [Posterior Analytics; BK I, Ch. 31. 87b lines 33 - 34]
Nominalists do believe in general concepts (discourse would be impossible otherwise!), they just deny that they are anything but secondary to particulars. This can easily degenerate into a tiresome debate because the word "nominalist" has many meanings. The interpretation I'm suggesting does not conflict with "moderate nominalism" at all and has no bearing in itself on the problem of universals. Universals are eternal (i.e. extratemporal) as Aristotle says many times, as is science, for all that a universal is defined as what is predicated of many. Whether the universals should be more or less hypostasized, or not, is another (and hugely controversial) question.
IAN: Universals are eternal (i.e. extratemporal) as Aristotle says many times, as is science,
ARISTOTLE: if it were, it would not be commensurately universal - the term we apply to what is always and everywhere [Same section of the Posterior Analytics]
"Always" sounds like "At all times" to me, which, in turn sounds TEMPORAL to me.
I found this line interesting: "The philosopher argues that a noun arises as a symbol of our impression of something." As with your example the word flower, for instance, if you said "anthērós" the noun would be flower. However, it also implies blooming, which can be a noun, verb or an adjective. Depending on our impression, anthērós may not be a flower, but could be used to give the impression of a fragrant thought or idea, correct?
Hey there, thank you for your comment. Anthos is the word for flower. Antheros is a derivative to describe something that has flowers in a real or metaphorical way. Yes
One point - universals are intramental concepts like "man" (viz. in general). Some translations make it "a man" but this is a mistake. So what is translated "all men" does not mean "every individual man" but rather the whole of the universal. Ex: "some animals are men" means not "some of the individual animals are men right now", but more like "a portion of the extratemporal universal "animal" is the species "man"". And ofc this is what he's talking about with "universals taken universally" etc earlier on. The earlier logical works must be interpreted in light of the Posterior Analytics, and the Analytica (esp. the mixed modals!) will not make sense if you read universals as sets of particulars. But this is gold overall, delighted to see people working through these difficult and oft-neglected texts. I'll try to keep following along.
Is the above your refutation of nominalists like William of Ockham of "razor fame"? How else is a nominalist to describe some of our supposed (by nominalists) errors (about universals) other than our confusion about "sets of particulars", since we think of them as "general ideas or concepts", while nominalists do not believe in "general ideas" or "general concepts"?
He is trying to convey what he thinks to have been the way Aristotle thought about universals. Thank you for adding to this very useful conversation :)
You're welcome. He was trying to do that for sure. But, still, something seems a little "off" for I think that both you and I know that 1 man or 1 individual "anything" of an unambiguous Aristotelian Square of Logical opposition is entirely capable of logically contradicting the universal logical opposite. In fact I watched you employing one of those metaphorical squares to refute some fella who preferred Leibniz to Aristotle in your very first post (if memory serves).
And we also know (I presume) that universals are predicable of more than one thing --- which is much less ambiguous than the debates about universals which erupted after Aquinas' death --- which began a death spiral for/of scholasticism. Wouldn't want to see that here. Love the beauty with which you introduce your logical explications i.e. the images at your site. You are very clever, very hard working and very clear. Well done.
Kevin
Yes, one counter example falsifies a universal, but universals in themselves are not bounded by time nor are they sets. He does say this in the posterior analytics and elsewhere. "1+1 is 2" doesn't refer to particular monads, nor do other universals like "man" when we speak as 'scientists'. Just because universals are said of many, and predicable of particulars, does not mean that the universal itself is a "set" of particulars, Aristotle rejects this in Post An when he talks about how science has nothing to do with particulars. And again if you make it to the mixed modals, and try to follow his logic there, you'll see pretty quickly that it's not possible for these universals to be sets, besides the other passages I've mentioned that openly deny that universals are sets of particulars. It is not logically possible for "man=all these men here" to be predicated universally and of other men, universals must be prior to particulars and hence not particulars or mere groups *of* particulars at all. How could a set of particulars be predicated of a particular? This is not a "fringe" opinion lol. And it has nothing to do with metaphysics, it's simply the logical nature of the universal, and says nothing about what a universal really is or how it's related to particulars, which is a separate question. Whether "the dyad" is a being, a cause, a concept, etc has no bearing on "2" not being "every 2 that ever has been, is, or will be", which would be incoherent. What does this mean for de int? When Aristotle talks about universals taken universally those aren't empty words, and the thought conveyed by "all men" is not, in fact, "all the men". Likewise a universal simpliciter would be "man", not "a man".
IAN: [Initial post.] So what is translated "all men" does not mean "every individual man" but rather the whole of the universal.
IAN: [This post] Aristotle rejects this [Aristotle rejects the idea that universals are sets of particulars; even though Aristotle hadn't heard of Uncle Bertie's "set theory" in the 4th century B.C. KB] in Post An when he talks about how science has nothing to do with particulars. [N.B. Science has nothing to do with particulars.]
ARISTOTLE: With a view to action experience seems in no respect inferior to art, and men of experience succeed even better than those who have theory without experience. (The reason is that experience is knowledge of individuals, art of universals, and actions and productions are all concerned with the INDIVIDUAL; for the physician does not cure man, except in an incidental way, but Callias or Socrates or some other called by some such individual name, who happens to be a man. If, then, a man has the theory without the experience, and recognizes the UNIVERSAL but does not know the INDIVIDUAL included in this, he will often fail to cure; for it is the INDIVIDUAL that is to be cured.) [Metaphysics BkI, Ch.1, 4rth paragraph]
1. COMMENT and 1 QUESTION and 1 Admonition: Medical science has everything to do with particular individuals --- a.k.a. particulars! So what are you attempting above, Ian? I have an idea for you. When you try to attribute an idea to Aristotle, then quote him.
Aristotle actually said that UNIVERSALS are IMPERCEPTIBLE, which refutes the entire cohort of British so-called "Empiricists", including Uncle Bertie Russell and his goofy "sets". Quote
ARISTOTLE: Seeing, therefore, that demonstrations are commensurately universal and universals imperceptible, we clearly cannot obtain scientific knowledge by the act of perception. [Posterior Analytics; BK I, Ch. 31. 87b lines 33 - 34]
Besides the above, it probably is a refutation (or at least the implicit contradiction) of nominalism.
Nominalists do believe in general concepts (discourse would be impossible otherwise!), they just deny that they are anything but secondary to particulars. This can easily degenerate into a tiresome debate because the word "nominalist" has many meanings. The interpretation I'm suggesting does not conflict with "moderate nominalism" at all and has no bearing in itself on the problem of universals. Universals are eternal (i.e. extratemporal) as Aristotle says many times, as is science, for all that a universal is defined as what is predicated of many. Whether the universals should be more or less hypostasized, or not, is another (and hugely controversial) question.
IAN: Universals are eternal (i.e. extratemporal) as Aristotle says many times, as is science,
ARISTOTLE: if it were, it would not be commensurately universal - the term we apply to what is always and everywhere [Same section of the Posterior Analytics]
"Always" sounds like "At all times" to me, which, in turn sounds TEMPORAL to me.
Again, What are you trying to do?
I found this line interesting: "The philosopher argues that a noun arises as a symbol of our impression of something." As with your example the word flower, for instance, if you said "anthērós" the noun would be flower. However, it also implies blooming, which can be a noun, verb or an adjective. Depending on our impression, anthērós may not be a flower, but could be used to give the impression of a fragrant thought or idea, correct?
Hey there, thank you for your comment. Anthos is the word for flower. Antheros is a derivative to describe something that has flowers in a real or metaphorical way. Yes