(18a34-19a7) of Ch. 9 If an assertion about a future occurence is already true when we utter it, then the future has been predetermined and nothing happens by chance
I would just argue that the statement "the future has been predetermined" does not entail the statement "nothing happens by chance." It does indeed entail that nothing happens by chance within time; however, time, and in that matter space, may be a thing itself and not "nothing" and we can perceive of the idea that time could've come about undetermined: by spontaneus emergence or, perhaps, an act of God. Then everything within time is predetermined, without time itself being predetermined, at most limited to the set of all best possible worlds according to the ONE.
As you probably already acknowledge, Aristotle introduces the distinction between necessity and chance not as such. In other words, he is not presenting the two as mutually exclusive in all domains and in every way. He does it only within the horizon of a specific argument. The argument is "if an assertion about a future event can be true, then it is necessary for this future event to happen. If it is necessary for it to happen, then it does not happen by chance."
This is one of my most beloved Aristotelian passages. It is a whole implicit philosophy of language
Thank you for your kind words sir.
Again a great article.
I would just argue that the statement "the future has been predetermined" does not entail the statement "nothing happens by chance." It does indeed entail that nothing happens by chance within time; however, time, and in that matter space, may be a thing itself and not "nothing" and we can perceive of the idea that time could've come about undetermined: by spontaneus emergence or, perhaps, an act of God. Then everything within time is predetermined, without time itself being predetermined, at most limited to the set of all best possible worlds according to the ONE.
Hey there!
Thank you for this very interesting angle.
As you probably already acknowledge, Aristotle introduces the distinction between necessity and chance not as such. In other words, he is not presenting the two as mutually exclusive in all domains and in every way. He does it only within the horizon of a specific argument. The argument is "if an assertion about a future event can be true, then it is necessary for this future event to happen. If it is necessary for it to happen, then it does not happen by chance."