Aristotle's On Interpretation Ch. 8. segment 18a18-18a26: The conflation of distinct concepts leads to the creation of assertions which appear simple, yet are compound
(18a18-18a26) of Ch. 8: The conflation of distinct concepts leads to the creation of assertions which appear simple, yet are compound
On what constitutes a simple assertion and what a compound assertion
An assertion may be (i) simple or it may be (ii) compound. By way of studying what constitutes a simple assertion, we make a first attempt to establish what constitutes a compound assertion.
(i) With a simple assertion we communicate one thing of one thing. The thing we communicate we call a predicate. The thing of which we communicate a predicate we call a subject. A subject and predicate each comprise at least one simple speech instance. Namely, a subject comprises at least one noun (e.g. ostrich), whereas a predicate at least one verb (e.g. run). Each may also comprise a composite speech instance (λόγος) insofar as this only signifies one thing. For example, as Aristotle mentions in Ch. 5 17a10-17a15, “two-footed land animal”, a combination of nouns, signifies one thing. Furthermore, as we have seen in Ch. 7, the speech instance “is white” combines a verb with a noun, yet counts as one thing. In this way, the assertion “an ostrich runs” is as much a simple assertion as “a two-footed land animal is white” to the extent that they both communicate one thing about one thing.
(ii) A compound assertion comprises multiple simple assertions. These are joined together with conjuctions such as “and”. As we have so far determined, each simple assertion comprises one thing as predicate and another as subject. This established, some of the simple assertions in a compound assertion may share their predicate or subject. As such, with a compound assertion we may either communicate (i) two or more things about one and the same thing (e.g. an ostrich runs and hides), (ii) one and the same thing about two or more things (e.g. an ostrich and a lion run), or (iii) two or more things about two or more things (e.g. a lion hunts and an ostrich runs).
On the conflation of concepts and how it leads to compound assertions
Now, as we have demonstrated in Ch. 8 17a13-18a17, with one thing (ἓν) we mean a concept. It is the concept (νόημα) of something in the world (πρᾶγμα) insofar as it presents itself as one thing. This is so to the extent we can communicate such a concept in speech to others. Typically, such a thing we express as a single noun or verb. We may also express it as a composite instance of speech (e.g. two-footed land animal).
Be that as it may, we often encounter situations where an interlocutor conflates multiple distinct concepts and expresses them as a single noun or verb. This may happen through ignorance, by accident or deliberately. All the same, the end result is an assertion which appears simple, yet is in fact compound. To illustrate how this may come about, I provide two common examples of it: (i) conflating a thing with one of its representations, (ii) conflating various senses a noun or verb may carry. There are countless iterations of how an interlocutor may engage in conflation, so by no means consider this list complete.
(i) conflating a thing with one of its representations
For example, in the assertion “Socrates is wise” an interlocutor may be conflating the concept of historical Socrates with the concept of Socrates as protagonist of Plato’s dialogues. As such, “Socrates is wise” constitutes not one affirmation but two. It is no different from saying “Plato’s Socrates and the historical Socrates are wise”. This we may, in turn, express as “Plato’s Socrates is wise and the historical Socrates is wise”.
Similarly, in the assertion “Aphrodite is beautiful” an interlocutor may be conflating the concept of Aphrodite as goddess of beauty and love with the concept of some statue which depicts her. In this case, “Aphrodite is beautiful” may be restated as “Aphrodite and a statue which depicts her are beautiful”. This, in turn, becomes no different from “Aphrodite is beautiful and a statue which depicts her is beautiful”.
(ii) conflating various senses a noun or verb may carry
By way of illustration, in the assertion “a child cries”, an interlocutor may be conflating “to cry” in the sense of “to shed tears” with “to cry” in the sense of “to scream”. Thus, where “a child cries” appears to be a simple assertion, it is in fact a compound assertion. This we may express as “a child sheds tears and screams” or “a child sheds tears and the same child screams”.
Moreover, in the assertion “the asparagus is not healthy”, an interlocutor may be conflating the concept of healthy in the sense of having good health with that of healthy in the sense of being nutritious. This makes the assertion “the asparagus is not healthy” a compound assertion which we may express as “the asparagus is neither of good health nor healthy to eat” or simply as “the asparagus is not of good health and the asparagus is not healthy to eat”.
Having reached this point, we once again highlight that in each case the conflated concepts in no way constitute one thing. Each concept is distinct and separate from the others. This remains so even when such concepts cooccur, or are somehow related. The same Socrates cannot be a historical person and a character in Plato’s works simultaneously. Further, even if the health condition of asparagus determines whether it is healthy to eat, the two senses of healthy remain separate concepts.
Key points: (i) A compound assertion is no more than two or more simple assertions joined together with conjuctions. (ii) Some or all assertions which make up the compound assertion may share their predicate or subject. As such, a compound assertion may communicate (a) multiple things about multiple things, (b) multiple things about one and the same thing, (c) one and the same thing about multiple things. (iii) Assertions in which two or more concepts are conflated and expressed as one noun or verb have the appearance of a simple assertion, yet are compound. (iv) This is because the conflated concepts remain distinct even when an interlocutor treats them as one thing.